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In the Utah Court of Appeals 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Salvador Torres-Garcia, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20040815-CA 
Brief of Appellee 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2003). The appeal was poured 
over to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (West 2004). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
1 
Statement of the Issues 
1. Where the State's expert witness was an employee of the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney's Office, was the prosecutor required to comply with the 
statutory 30-day notice requirement? 
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] a trial court's rulings on section 77-
17-13 objections only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Bredefoft, 966 P.2d 285, 
290 (Utah App. 1998). 
2. Where the State sought to establish the murderer's identity as the victim's 
drug dealer, was evidence of drug distribution found in defendant's apartment 
properly admitted under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Standard of Review. "When reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence 
under rule 404(b), [the appellate court] appl[ies] an abuse of discretion stan-
dard." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,II 42, 28 P.3d 1278. 
Relevant Provisions of Law 
Section 77-17-13, Utah Code Annotated, and rules 401, 402, 403, and 404(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, are relevant to a determination of this appeal. Those 
provisions are reproduced in Addendum A. 
2 
Statement of the Case 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with murder for the shooting death of John Todd 
Irwin on September 23, 2003. R. 4-5. Co-defendant Eliazar Balbuene-Para was 
charged with felony murder and tried with defendant. See R. 256-60. Eight days 
before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that the evidence 
seized from defendant's apartment be excluded under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. R. 69-70. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court denied the 
motion. R. 116-19, 254. The day before trial, defendant requested a continuance of 
the trial, alleging that the prosecutor had failed to meet the notice requirements 
for its expert witness, Craig Watson. R. 255: 4-5. The court initially ruled that 
defendant was entitled to a continuance, but reversed its ruling on the first day 
of trial. R. 255:14-15; R. 256:11-16. 
Following a three-day trial, the jury acquitted Babluene-Para of felony 
murder, but convicted defendant of murder as charged. R. 160; 216: 20-21. R. 
216: 20. After obtaining a presentence investigation report, the court sentenced 
defendant to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life. R. 222, 229-30. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 233. 
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Summary of Facts 
Defendant operated a drug business with co-defendant Eliazar Balbuene-
Para. R. 256: 178-79, 185; R. 258: 289, 382, 398; see R. 258: 294-99, 434-36. As is 
typical in such illicit operations, defendants were not known by their given 
names, but by nicknames. R. 258: 438. Defendant was known as Mario and 
Balbuene-Para as Fernando, but these nicknames changed from time to time. See 
R. 258: 373, 382, 398-99.! Defendants employed runners to make drug deliveries 
and provided them with cell phones and cars to carry out those deliveries. R. 256: 
185; R. 258: 289,382, 398-99,437. 
Todd and Clara Irwin, who were staying at the Dream Inn Motel with Clara's 
sister Allie, were regular customers of defendants. R. 256: 152-54. Clara ordered 
drugs daily—typically, three times a day. R. 256:179. To help support their drug 
habit, Clara worked the streets as a prostitute. R. 256: 157-58. On two occasions, 
she exchanged sex for drugs with Carlos Delgado —one of defendant's runners. 
R. 256:158,180-81; R. 258: 289. 2 
1
 For example, Fernando was also known as Miguel. R. 258: 373-74. 
2
 Carlos's full name was Juan Carlos Delgado Cruz, but he generally went 
by Carlos Delgado. See R. 258: 398,407. 
4 
A Cocaine Delivery 
On September 23, 2003, Todd and Clara smoked cocaine all day. R. 256: 155, 
190. When the couple ran out of drugs that evening, Clara called for more 
cocaine. R. 256: 156-57, 163; R. 258: 238-39. After the call, Fernando telephoned 
Carlos and directed him to make a delivery to the Irwins. R. 258: 412-13. Twenty 
minutes later, Carlos arrived at the motel in his gold Nissan, parking in front of 
the Irwins7 motel room. R. 256: 157-58, 182; R. 258: 400-401, 413. He exited the 
car—leaving the engine running, the headlights on, and the driver's side door 
open—and entered the Irwins' motel room to deliver the cocaine. R. 256: 158; R. 
258: 235, 400,409. 
While Carlos was in the motel room with the Irwins, Officer Kristopher 
Hanks pulled in behind the gold Nissan to investigate the unattended car. R. 258: 
233-35. When Carlos and Todd saw the officer walk up to the car, they stepped 
outside to find out what the officer wanted. R. 256: 159-60; R. 258: 236-38, 400-
401. Before exiting, however, Carlos stashed some forty balloons of heroin in the 
motel room. R. 256:158-61,188,193; R. 258: 401, 409,414-15. In speaking with the 
two men, Officer Hanks learned that the car belonged to Carlos. R. 256:159-60; R. 
258 238-39. After Officer Hanks warned Carlos that his car might get stolen if he 
left it that way unattended, Todd rejoined his wife Clara in their motel room. R. 
258 238-39. Carlos asked if he was okay to leave and Officer Hanks said, "Yeah, 
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go ahead/7 R. 258: 239. Carlos drove away, leaving the heroin behind. R. 256:158-
61; R. 258: 239. 
Refusing to Return the Heroin 
After Carlos left, Clara called Fernando and told him that Carlos had left the 
heroin in their motel room. R. 256: 161-63, 185-86, 193. Fernando told Clara to 
deliver the heroin to Carlos at a nearby gas station and said he would give them 
$30 in cocaine for their trouble. R. 256: 163, 186; R. 258: 322; see also R. 258: 402, 
409, 416. Overhearing the conversation, Todd took the telephone from Clara and 
demanded fifty dollars worth from Fernando, threatening to flush the heroin 
down the toilet if he did not give it to him. R. 256:163,186; R. 258: 322. Todd met 
Carlos at the station, but did not give back the heroin because Carlos had no 
cocaine for him. R. 256:163-65,186-88,193; R. 258: 324-25, 403, 409, 416-17. Todd 
returned to his motel room and Carlos notified Fernando that Todd had refused 
to return the drugs. R. 256:163,187,193; R. 258: 403,409,417. 
The Murder 
Some fifteen minutes later, defendant, Fernando, and at least one unidentifed 
man arrived at the motel in a red SUV. R. 256: 167; R. 258: 261, 363-64, 404-05. 
Carlos and his brother-in-law arrived in Carlos's gold Nissan at about the same 
time. R. 258: 362-66, 382, 403-05, 417-18. Armed with a .45 caliber handgun, 
defendant knocked on the door, and when Todd answered, defendant and four 
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or five of the other men, including Fernando, rushed into the room. R. 256: 167, 
198, 207, 210, 214; R. 258: 286-87, 326, 356-59, 365, 371, 405. The unidentified man 
also had a gun. R. 258: 405. 
After the men entered the motel room, defendant hit Todd in the back of the 
head with the butt of his gun. R. 256: 167, 198; R. 258: 396, 418. Todd fell to his 
knees and then returned the heroin to defendant. R. 256: 168-70, 20-06; R. 258: 
387. Defendant hit Todd again and said, "This ain't all of it." R. 256: 170, 198. 
Clara insisted that Todd had returned all of the heroin and pleaded with 
defendant not to hurt Todd. R. 256:170. But defendant ignored Clara's pleas and 
shot Todd in the head. R. 256: 170, 200, 203-06; R. 258: 308-09, 396. Todd fell into 
the adjoining bedroom and later died from the gunshot wound. R. 256: 200, 203-
06; R. 258: 303, 396. 
Defendant and the other men ran out of the motel room. R. 256: 171; R. 258: 
309. Although defendant arrived in the red SUV, he fled in the gold Nissan with 
Carlos. R. 256: 171, 201-02; R. 258: 253, 259, 309, 327, 405-06, 418. The others fled 
in the red SUV. R. 258: 253, 259, 309, 327. 
The Investigation 
Almost one month after the murder, police picked up Carlos while he was 
driving his Nissan—painted white since the murder. R. 258: 383, 390-92, 408. 
Two and a half weeks later, police executed a search warrant on defendant's 
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apartment. R. 258: 290, 378. Inside defendant's bedroom closet, police found five 
fist-sized packages of cocaine with a street value of between $10,000 and $12,000, 
cutting boards, an electronic scale needed for weighing and repackaging drugs, a 
sealing device, a package of small party balloons, and $8,090 in cash. R. 258: 294-
95, 298-99, 434-35. Police also found a zippered pouch containing two .25 caliber 
semiautomatic pistols and a .380 caliber pistol. R. 258: 295-97. The pouch also 
contained various kinds of ammunition. R. 258: 296-97. Although a .45 caliber 
gun was not found in the apartment, .45 caliber pistol rounds were inside the 
pouch. R. 258: 297,306. Police also found several cell phones. R. 258: 299. 
At an interview a week after the search, Clara identified defendant as Todd's 
killer from a photo array. R. 256:172; R. 258: 279, 377-78. About one month later, 
she again identified him as the shooter at a live lineup. R. 258: 286. 
At trial, Craig Watson, the assistant chief investigator for the DA's Office, 
testified that the drugs, weapons, and other evidence found at defendant's 
apartment suggested that defendant was operating a drug distribution business 
that ranged from street-level sales to mid-level distribution. R. 258: 436. He 
testified that mid-level distributors often provide cell phones and cars to their 
runners to facilitate deliveries. R. 258: 437. He explained that the runners do not 
necessarily use the same cell phone or car on all their deliveries. R. 258: 437. He 
also confirmed that drug amounts are often identified in terms of their price. R. 
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258: 437-38. For example, twenty dollars of cocaine may be referred to as a 
twenty. R. 258: 438. 
Summary of Argument 
I. Notice for Expert Witness. Defendant claims that the trial court should 
have continued the trial because the State did not comply with the statutory 30-
day notice requirement for expert witnesses. Contrary to defendant's claim, the 
30-day notice requirement did not apply here because the expert was an 
employee of the prosecutor's office and defendant had sufficient notice that the 
expert might be called to testify. Even assuming arguendo that the State was 
required to comply with the 30-day notice requirement and failed to do so, that 
failure did not result in substantial prejudice to the defense. 
II. Bad Acts Evidence. Defendant contends that the trial court should have 
excluded the evidence seized from his apartment as violating rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Contrary to that claim, the evidence was admitted for the 
proper noncharacter purpose of proving defendant's identity as the murderer. It 
was also admitted to prove plan, opportunity, and motive. Identity was the only 
element at issue before the jury. Establishing defendant's plan, opportunity, and 
motive helped establish identity. The probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
9 
Argument 
I. The Prosecution Was Not Required to Give the 30-Day Notice 
Required Under Section 77-17-13(1) for the Assistant Chief In-
vestigator of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. 
A. Trial court ruling. 
Nearly six weeks before trial, the State filed a Notice of Expert Witness, 
notifying the court of its intent to call Craig Watson, an investigator with the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney's Office (DA's Office), as an expert on "drug 
trafficking/7 R. 60-61. Attached to the notice was Watson's curriculum vitae. R. 
40-41, 61; R. 255:10. Five days before trial, the State also submitted a witness list 
identifying Watson as one of the State's proposed witnesses. R. 105-06.3 At a 
motion hearing that same day, the State again represented that it intended to call 
Craig Watson as an expert to testify that the evidence seized from defendant's 
apartment was indicative of a drug distribution business. R. 254: 6-7. 
At a pretrial conference four days later—the day before trial—defense counsel 
requested that the trial be continued because they had not received the Notice of 
Expert Witness, and because in any event, the notice did not include Watson's 
report or a written summary of his proposed testimony. R. 255: 4-7. Although 
3
 Copies of the Notice of Expert Witness, Curriculum Vitae, and Plaintiffs 
Proposed Witness List are included in Addendum B. 
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the Certificate of Delivery certified only that it was mailed to counsel for co-
defendant Balbuene-Para (Fernando), see R. 62, the prosecutor represented that 
the notice was in fact sent to counsel's office. R. 255: 9. The prosecutor's paralegal 
was present and prepared to confirm that she sent the notice to counsel's office. 
R. 255: 8-9. Defendant's counsel responded that the prosecution "probably did 
send [the notice] to [him]," but that counsel had not seen it. R. 255: 5, 11. 
Defendant nevertheless urged the court to continue the trial because the 
prosecution had not included a summary of the proposed testimony. R. 255: 5-7, 
10-11,15-16. 
The trial court found that "the State had in fact submitted notice of the expert 
testimony," that "it was done in a timely fashion," and that it included a 
statement that Watson "would be called to testify concerning drug trafficking." 
R. 255:14. However, because the statement regarding the testimoy was general in 
nature and defense counsel represented that the statement was insufficient for 
them to counter the testimony, the court ruled that defendants were entitled to a 
continuance. R. 255: 15-18. Because the State was holding Clara Irwin in jail as a 
material witness, the State elected to proceed to trial as scheduled without the 
expert testimony. R. 255: 32-33. 
On the following day, before jury selection, the State directed the court to 
subsection (6) of section 77-17-13, which exempts experts employed by the State 
11 
or one of its political subdivisions from the notice requirements of subsection (1). 
R. 256: 8. In response, defense counsel reiterated that he had not received the 
notice and argued that the discovery received was insufficient, even under the 
subsection (6) exemption. R. 256: 9-10. The court thereafter modified its ruling, 
concluding that the discovery provided was sufficient to give the defense the 
required notice for state employees. R. 256: 14-15. The court ruled that Watson 
could not testify until defense counsel had an opportunity to interview him and 
ordered that Watson meet with counsel after the court recessed for the day. R. 
256:15-16.16. 
B. Analysis. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his 
motion for a continuance of the trial for the State's alleged failure to comply with 
the expert notice requirements of section 77-17-13, Utah Code Annotated. Aplt. 
Brf. at 20-33. This claim fails. 
Section 77-17-13 requires that a party intending to call an expert witness "give 
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days 
before trial ..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) (West 2004). The notice must 
include: (1) the expert's name and address, (2) the expert's curriculum vitae, and 
(3) a copy of the expert's report or a written explanation of the expert's proposed 
testimony and a statement that the expert will be made available to consult with 
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the opposing party. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(b). If the party calling the 
expert does not "substantially comply" with these requirements, "the opposing 
party, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, [is] entitled to a continuance 
of the t r i a l . . . sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-17-13(4). 
Subsection (6) provides an exemption to subsection (l)'s detailed notice 
requirement for experts who are employed by the State or one of its political 
subdivisions: 
[Subsection (1)] does not apply to the use of an expert who is an 
employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the op-
posing party is on reasonable notice through general discovery that 
the expert may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is 
made available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party 
upon reasonable notice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). The trial court properly concluded that Craig 
Watson fell under this exemption to the 30-day notice requirement. 
Defendant argues that this exemption applies only when the information 
received through general discovery "informs the defendant of the name, address, 
and qualifications of the expert; that the State intends to call the expert as a 
witness; and of the substance of the expert's testimony." Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. This 
argument is not supported by the plain language of the statute. See J. Pochynok 
Co., Inc. v. Smedsmd, 2005 UT 39, \ 15, - Utah Adv. Rep. - . (holding that the 
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Court "look[s] first to the plain language of a statute to determine its meaning" 
and "[o]nly when there is an ambiguity" will it "look further"). 
Under the plain language of the statute, the subsection (6) exemption applies 
if three conditions are met: 
(i) the expert is an employee of the state or one of its political subdivi-
sions; 
(ii) the opposing party is put "on reasonable notice through general 
discovery that the expert may be called as a witness at trial"; and 
(iii) "the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with the 
opposing party upon reasonable notice." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6) (emphasis added). Contrary to defendant's claim, 
there is no requirement that the expert's address be provided; there is no 
requirement that the expert's qualifications be disclosed; and there is no 
requirement that a summary of the expert's testimony be provided. All that is 
required is that the defendant be put on notice that the expert may testify and 
that the expert be made available to defendant for consultation. Upon consulta-
tion, counsel for defendant may then determine the substance of the testimony 
and any other relevant information. 
Because each of the three conditions was met here, the trial court properly 
concluded that subsection (1) did not apply. 
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The first condition for a subsection (6) exemption was met because Watson, as 
the assistant chief investigator for the DA's Office, R. 40, 60, was an employee of 
one of the State's political subdivisions. Defendant does not contend otherwise. 
The second condition for a subsection (6) exemption was likewise met. As 
noted, the trial court found that "the State had in fact submitted notice of the 
expert testimony" of Craig Watson, that "it was done in a timely fashion" — 
almost six weeks before trial, and that it included a statement that Watson 
"would be called to testify concerning drug trafficking." R. 255:14. 
Defendant challenges that finding on appeal, arguing that the State "did not 
serve notice on [him]," but only on counsel for co-defendant Balbuene-Para. 
Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. Defendant claims that this challenge was preserved below 
because he "claimed throughout the discussion that he never received notice." 
Aplt. Brf. at 29 fn.l (citing R. 255: 4-16). Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
It is true that defendant's trial counsel maintained that he had been unable to 
find any such notice in his files and had not received the notice. See R. 255: 4-5; R. 
256: 9-10. However, defendant's counsel did not contend that the State failed to 
send the notice to him. To the contrary, at the pretrial conference the day before 
trial, counsel represented that he was "confident that [the prosecution] attempted 
to deliver the [curriculum vitae] and the name of the witness to [them] in April 
as [the prosecution] indicated . . . ." R. 256: 5. Later, counsel stated that he 
15 
"believe[d] that the prosecution probably did send [the notice] to [them]/' even 
though counsel had not seen it. R. 255:10-11. 
Because counsel did not challenge the prosecutor's representation that the 
notice was delivered to his office, he did not preserve the issue for appeal. 
Defendant argues that even if his challenge was not preserved, the finding 
should be reversed as plain error. Aplt. Brf. at 29 fn.l. This argument also fails 
because counsel invited any such error. The law is well settled that counsel may 
not affirmatively lead the court into believing that no issue exists regarding a 
particular matter, and then raise that issue later on appeal. See State v. Bloomfield, 
2003 UT App 3, If 25, 63 P.3d 110. In this case, counsel expressly stated that he 
"believe [d] that the prosecution probably did send [the notice] to [him] . . . ." R. 
255: 10-11. In doing so, he led the court to believe that notice was not an issue. 
Under the invited error doctrine, he is now precluded from challenging that 
finding on appeal, even under plain error. See State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1206 
(Utah App. 1991).4 
Even assuming arguendo that counsel did not invite error, defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's finding that "the State ha[d] in fact submitted notice 
Defendant does not argue on appeal or otherwise suggest that actual no-
tice is required to satisfy the notice requirement for a subsection (6) exemption. 
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of the expert testimony" still fails. 'To demonstrate that a finding of fact is 
clearly erroneous, the defendant 'must first marshal all the evidence that supports 
the trial court's findings. After marshaling the supportive evidence, the appellant 
then must show that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's 
findings/" State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, H 60, 28 R3d 1278 (quoting State v. 
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108) (emphases supplied in Widdison). 
However, "[w]hen an appellant fails to properly discharge his duty to marshal, 
[this Court] assume[s] that 'the evidence introduced at trial adequately sup-
ported the findings,' and, accordingly, affirm[s] the findings as written." State ex 
rel L.M., 2001 UT App 314,If 15, 37 P.3d 1188. 
Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence. Defendant's marshaling here is 
limited to the Certificate of Delivery which certifies mailing only to co-
defendant's counsel. Aplt Brf. at 29 & fn.l. Defendant ignores the prosecutor's 
proffer that notice was sent to his counsel at the Salt Lake Legal Defender's 
Association (LDA) and the presence of the prosecutor's paralegal at the hearing 
to so testify if called upon. See R. 255: 8-9. This Court should therefore assume 
that the evidence supported the trial court's finding and affirm that finding. See 
State ex rel L.M., 2001 UT App 314, % 15 (citation omitted). 
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In any event, the evidence supported the trial court's finding. Defendant did 
not challenge the prosecutor's proffer that his paralegal sent the notice to LDA. 
The trial court's finding, therefore, was supported by the evidence. See State v. 
Peterson, 841 P.2d 21, 26 (Utah App. 1992) (affirming trial court finding based, in 
part, on State's proffer of evidence).5 
The third and final condition for a subsection (6) exemption was also satisfied. 
This condition requires that the State make the witness "available to coopera-
tively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable notice." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-13(6). Under this condition, therefore, the State's obligation to make the 
witness available is triggered "upon reasonable notice" from the defense. See icL 
As noted, a Notice of Expert Witness, identifying Watson as an expert 
witness, was filed almost six weeks before trial. R. 40, 60-62. A witness list, also 
identifying Watson, was filed five days before trial. R. 105-07. And five days 
before trial (Thursday, May 20, 2004), the prosecutor orally represented in a 
motion hearing that Watson would testify as an expert about the drug distribu-
5
 Even assuming arguendo that the defense had not received the Notice of 
Expert Witness, no one disputes that the defense was put on notice that Watson 
would be called as an expert on drug distribution five days before trial. Watson 
was identified on a witness list submitted that day and during a motion hearing 
held that day. Accordingly, the defense was placed "on reasonable notice 
through general discovery that [Watson] may be called as a witness at trial." 
Utah Code Ann. $ 77-17-13(6). 
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tion business. R. 254: 6-7, 27. Defendant gave no notice, reasonable or otherwise, 
that he desired an interview with Watson. On the day before trial, defendant 
objected to Watson's testimony, arguing that the State did not comply with 
subsection (1). This was the first time that defendant expressed a desire to meet 
with Watson to discuss his testimony. 
The trial court initially ruled that Watson could not testify because the State 
had not complied with subsection (1), but reversed that ruling the following day 
—the first day of trial. See R. 255:19-20, 32-33; R. 256:11-16.6 The court concluded 
that Watson could testify because subsection (1) did not apply and it ordered that 
Watson be made available for consultation with defense counsel after the court 
recessed later that day. R. 256: 15-16. As a result, Watson was made available to 
the defense within one day after defendant expressed a desire to meet with him. 
In sum, Watson was made " available to cooperatively consult" with defense 
counsel the day after the defense objected to his testimony. And nothing in the 
record suggests that the prosecution did not permit him to meet with the defense 
sooner. Therefore, the third and final condition for a subsection (6) exemption 
6
 Defendant states that "[f]ive days before trial, the trial court recognized 
[defendant] was entitled to a continuance under subsection one because he 
needed time to prepare." Aplt. Brf. at 29. That ruling, however, came one day 
before trial, not five days, at the pretrial conference. R. 255:11-16. 
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was satisfied and the trial court properly permitted Watson to testify without a 
continuance of the trial. 
Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor should have complied with the 
requirements of subsection (1), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to continue the trial because such a continuance was not "necessary to 
prevent substantial prejudice/' See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4). 
This Court has held that section 77-17-13 "'clearly and unambiguously states 
that, upon the trial court's finding that a party failed to comply with the thirty 
day notice requirement, the opposing party "shall be" entitled to a continuance 
of the trial or hearing "sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony."'" 
State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, H 8, 19 P.3d 400 (quoting State v. Arrellano, 964 
P.2d 1167,1170 (Utah App. 1998)). The statute, however, has been amended since 
these cases issued. 
Before 2003, section 77-17-13 provided in relevant part as follows: 
If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements 
of this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance 
of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the tes-
timony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (1999). In 2003, the statute was amended and 
now reads: 
If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply 
with the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if nee-
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essary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of 
the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testi-
mony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (West 2004) (emphases added). The statute, 
therefore, no longer requires a continuance for a simple failure to comply with 
the subsection (1) requirements. Now, a continuance is mandatory only if (1) the 
prosecution does not "substantially comply with" those requirements, and (2) a 
continuance is "necessary to prevent substantial prejudice." IdL 
In this case, a continuance was not "necessary to prevent substantial preju-
dice." IcL Defendant claims that a continuance was necessary to allow counsel to: 
(1) examine Watson's testimony; (2) review Watson's curriculum vitae; (3) 
challenge the scientific reliability of Watson's testimony; and (4) adapt his trial 
strategy in light of Watson's proposed testimony. Aplt. Brf. at 31. This claim 
lacks merit. 
As noted, the prosecution sent the Notice of Expert Witness and Watson's 
curriculum vitae to defense counsel six weeks before trial. Accordingly, counsel 
should have been aware six weeks before trial of Watson's credentials and of his 
proposed testimony regarding "drug trafficking." Even in the unlikely event that 
the notice never reached LDA, defense counsel was aware of these documents 
the day before trial. See R. 255: 4-5 (indicating that counsel was aware of the 
documents the previous Friday). And five days before trial, the prosecutor told 
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the court and counsel that Watson would be called "as a distribution expert/7 R. 
255: 8. Moreover, the defense was well aware from the preliminary hearing that 
the prosecution alleged that defendant was a drug dealer. See R. 253. Therefore, 
early on, the defense was in a position to prepare against the allegation that 
defendant was a drug dealer. 
Defendant argues that the short notice was insufficient to challenge the 
scientific reliability of Watson's testimony. Aplt Brf. at 31. This argument is 
frivolous. Watson's testimony was not based on any scientific principles or 
theories. See R. 258: 427-42. 
Defendant also argues that the notice was insufficient for him to adequately 
address Watson's testimony and adapt his trial strategy accordingly. Aplt. Brf. at 
31-32. Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the testimony of Craig Watson 
was not such that it required a significant amount of preparation.7 
Defendant points out that the defense in this case rested on the "huge 
discrepancies" in Clara's testimony, including her alleged inconsistent state-
7
 The State acknowledges that this Court has concluded that testimony 
from an officer regarding the significance of a particular quantity of drug 
constitutes expert testimony. See State v. Rotlilisberger, 2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d 
1193. However, as discussed, the State maintains that preparation for such 
testimony is not extensive and does not require significant preparation. The State 
also notes that Rothlisberger is pending certiorari review. See 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 
2004). 
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ments about whether Todd asked for money or drugs in exchange for the heroin 
and the different names mentioned by Clara in referring to the dealers. Aplt. Brf. 
at 32. While these issues were explored, counsel's opening statement and 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 belies defendant's claim. The defense instead focused on 
alleged discrepancies in Clara's multiple accounts of the shooting, in her 
descriptions of the actors, and in her candor as to whether or not she knew the 
shooter. See R. 256:146-50; Def. Exh. 1. 
Defendant also argues that Watson's testimony regarding drug runners' use 
of different cars prejudiced him. Aplt. Brf. at 31. However, whether Carlos used 
different cars in delivering drugs was of no relevance at trial. Carlos admitted to 
driving to the motel in a gold Nissan and leaving in a gold Nissan. Where Clara 
testified that Todd's killer left in the gold Nissan, defendant's counsel effectively 
used that fact to suggest that Carlos, not defendant, was the shooter. See R. 259: 
507-10,516. 
Defendant also suggests that he could have called his own expert to refute 
Watson's testimony. Aplt Brf. at 33. That claim appears specious in light of the 
myriad of cases throughout the country recognizing firearms, scales, large sums 
of cash, and cutting equipment as "tools of the [drug] trade." See, e.g., United 
States v. Martinez, 988 F.2d 1078, 1083-84 (10* Or. 1991) (recognizing that 
firearms and large sums of cash are "tools of the trade" in the drug distribution 
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business); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 849 (11th Cir. 1985) (observing 
that "'[experience on the trial and appellate benches has taught that substantial 
dealers in narcotics keep firearms on their premises as tools of the trade almost to 
the same extent as they keep scales, glassine bags, cutting equipment, and other 
narcotic equipment'"); United States v. Weiner, 534 F.2d 15, 18 (2nd Cir. 1976) 
(recognizing that firearms, scales, glassine bags, and cutting equipment are 
commonly kept by narcotics dealers). In addition, cases throughout the country 
also demonstrate that drug dealers often use nicknames rather than their given 
names. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 891 So.2d 49 (La. App. 2004) (noting that drug 
dealer was known by a nickname); Dimas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App. 
1999) (same); Pope v. Netherlands 113 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); United States 
v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 742 (2*d Cir. 1992) (noting testimony from officer that 
drug dealers use nicknames). Therefore, the likelihood that defendant could call 
an expert to refute Watson's testimony is virtually nil. 
* * * 
In sum, because Craig Watson was an employee of the DA's office and the 
prosecutor's office provided sufficient notice that he would testify, the notice 
requirements of subsection (1) did not apply and the trial court properly 
proceeded with trial. In any event, the court's refusal to continue the trial did not 
result in substantial prejudice where Watson's testimony about drug distribution 
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is widely accepted and where defendant cannot show how his defense would 
have been altered in any significant or material way. 
I I . The Drugs, Firearms, and Ammunition Seized from Defendant's 
Apartment Were Properly Admitted to Establish Identity, Plan, 
Opportunity, and Motive Under Rule 404(b). 
In a pretrial motion filed a week before trial, defendant sought the exclusion, 
under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, of the weapons, drugs, and other 
evidence seized from defendant's apartment. R. 69-70. The trial court denied the 
motion, ruling that the evidence was "probative for the non-character purposes 
of proving identity, intent, plan, preparation and lack of accident" and that the 
evidence was not unduly prejudicial. R. 116-19 (Addendum C). 
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's rule 404(b) ruling. Aplt. Brf. 
at 33-46. He contends that the evidence was not offered for a proper noncharacter 
purpose, was not relevant, and was unduly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 33-41. Defendant further contends that absent 
admission of the evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. 
Aplt Brf. at 41-46. Defendant's claim fails. 
Rule 404(b) limits the use of bad acts evidence: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in confor-
mity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
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knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided 
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if 
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature 
of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The Utah Supreme Court has held that bad acts evidence is 
admissible under rule 404(b) "if the evidence satisfies the following three criteria: 
(1) the evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of 
those listed in rule 404(b); (2) the evidence meets the requirements of rule 402; 
and (3) the evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Alien, 2005 UT 
11, 1f 16, 108 P.3d 730. The weapons, drugs, and other evidence seized from 
defendant's apartment satisfy all three requirements. 
1. The evidence was offered for the proper, noncharacter pur-
pose of proving identity, plan, opportunity, and motive. 
The Court "must first determine whether the bad acts evidence [was] offered 
for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically listed in rule 
404(b)." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 18, 6 R3d 1120. If it was, the 
Court proceeds with the remainder of the analysis. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, If 
21, 993 P.2d 837, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1181 (2000). If not, the 
inquiry ends. Id. 
The evidence in this case was offered primarily to help prove identity—one of 
the proper noncharacter purposes specifically identified in rule 404(b). The 
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State's theory of the case was that defendant was Todd and Clara Irwin's drug 
dealer and that defendant murdered Todd after Carlos Delgado —one of 
defendant's drug runners —left some of defendant's heroin at Todd's motel room 
and Todd refused to return the heroin to defendant unless he gave Todd five 
balloons of cocaine for holding it. R. 256: 140-43. Clara identified defendant as 
her husband's killer and Carlos identified defendant as his drug dealer boss and 
one of two men who entered the Irwin's motel room with a gun. 
To corroborate Clara's identification of defendant as Todd's drug-dealer killer 
and Carlos's claim that defendant was the drug dealer boss who entered the 
motel room with a gun, the State introduced the evidence seized from defen-
dant's home —the half kilo of cocaine, the $8,000 in cash, the scales, the party 
balloons, the cell phones, and the firearms and ammunition. The evidence 
therefore was not offered to show defendant's propensity to commit crime, as 
defendant argues, but to corroborate the identification. See R. 255: 23 (trial court 
ruling that evidence would be admitted to prove identity). 
The evidence was also offered to prove opportunity and plan. See R. 255: 22. 
Although the cocaine found at the apartment could not be directly linked to the 
drugs purchased by the Irwins and although none of the firearms at the 
apartment were used used to kill Todd, this evidence was nevertheless admissi-
ble to show defendant's common plan or scheme, and opportunity, to sell drugs 
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and protect his drug business with force. In other words, not only was defendant 
a drug dealer, like the shooter, but he was also a dealer that was willing to 
enforce his trade through violence, like the shooter. 
The evidence also established motive. Absent a showing that defendant was 
the Irwins' drug dealer, a motive for the murder by defendant would be lacking. 
Accordingly, the State offered the evidence to establish defendant's motive for 
killing Todd—because Todd withheld heroin belonging to defendant. 
In sum, the evidence seized from defendant's apartment tends to prove the 
identity of the killer by corroborating Clara's identification. Where it helps 
establish identity, it is not rendered inadmissible simply because it tends to 
prove that he committed another crime. 
2. Evidence establishing defendant's identity, plan, opportunity, 
and motive was relevant. 
The Court must next determine "whether the bad acts evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 402, which permits admission of only relevant evidence/' 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, at ^ 19. 
"Bad acts evidence, like all evidence, must be relevant or it is inadmissible/' 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 26. Thus, had defendant admitted to killing 
Todd, but claimed some sort of justification or accident, identity might not have 
been relevant. But see Hart v. State, 57 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2002) (holding that 
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"identity is always an element of the crime charge that must be proved by the 
State" and is thus "always a material issue, whether or not in dispute" when 
applying rule 404(b)). But that was not the case here. 
The defense acknowledged at the outset that Todd Irwin's life "was sense-
lessly taken." R. 256:146. Therefore, the only element at issue before the jury was 
the identity of Todd's killer. In his opening statement, defense counsel asked the 
jury to question that identification in light of Clara's drug use at the time of the 
murder and the alleged inconsistencies in her description of the killer and in her 
accounts of the events surrounding the murder. R. 256: 147-49. Additionally, 
counsel asked the jury "to consider . . . who has a motive in this case" and 
suggested that Carlos Delgado —the drug runner—had the opportunity and 
motive to kill Todd. R. 256:150.8 
In his closing argument, counsel similarly attacked Clara's identification 
of defendant as the killer. R. 259: 500-513, 517-20. He asserted that three wit-
nesses who were at the scene of the crime did not testify because they could not 
identify defendant. R. 259: 514. He pointed out that clothes matching the 
description of the killer were not found at defendant's apartment. R. 259: 523. He 
surmised that Clara had never seen defendant before, but "made this up 
somewhere along the way." R. 259: 512. He suggested instead that Carlos was the 
killer. He emphaszied that Carlos had the opportunity to kill Todd. R. 259: 507-
10, 516 (arguing that Carlos was admittedly at the hotel room and that the killer 
left in his gold car). And he pointed out that Carlos had the motive to kill him, 
i.e., Todd and Carlos did not like each other because Carlos had an affair with 
Clara, R. 259: 516-17, and the drugs held by Todd came from Carlos, R. 259: 520. 
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While the evidence seized from defendant's apartment "did not conclusively 
prove" defendant's identity as the killer, it "made 'the existence of [that material, 
consequential] fact . . . more probable . . . than it would be without the evi-
dence/" Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT .59, Tf 27 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 401). The 
evidence was therefore relevant under rule 402. 
3. The probative value of the evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
The Court must last determine "whether the bad acts evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 403," which excludes relevant evidence when its "'probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ' " Id. at T^ 20 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403). 
"[I]f other crimes evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, 
there is no presumption against admissibility." Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 24. As 
recently observed by the Virginia Court of Appeals, "[i]n a sense, all evidence 
tending to prove guilt is prejudicial—at least from the point of view of the person 
standing trial." Thomas v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 738, 746 (Va. App. 2005). 
Rule 403 "intervenes only when the alleged prejudice tends to inflame irrational 
emotions or leads to illegitimate inferences. And even then, it becomes a matter 
of degree." hL Relevant evidence is inadmissible under rule 403 only "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
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confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence/7 Utah R. 
Evid. 403 (emphasis added); accord Decorso, 1999 UT 57, | 25. 
In determining whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially out-
weighs the probative value of the evidence, this Court considers '"the strength of 
the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence 
probably will rouse the jury to overmasting hostility."' Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f^ 29 
(quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988)). When these factors 
are applied to this case, it is apparent that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the evidence. 
First, the evidence that defendant was conducting an illegal drug distribution 
business was strong. As noted, police found one-half of a kilo of cocaine, more 
than $8,000 in cash, cutting boards, scales, party balloons, and firearms and 
ammunition in defendant's closet. R. 258: 294-99, 306, 434-35. This evidence is 
strongly indicative of an ongoing drug distribution business. See Martinez, 988 
F.2d at 1083-84 (recognizing that firearms and large sums of cash are "tools of the 
trade" in the drug distribution business); Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 849 (observing that 
"'[experience on the trial and appellate benches has taught that substantial 
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dealers in narcotics keep firearms on their premises as tools of the trade almost to 
the same extent as they keep scales, glassine bags, cutting equipment, and other 
narcotic equipment'"). 
Second, the crimes of murder and drug distribution are not similar, but are 
closely tied together in this case because the State alleged that the murder was 
motivated by the victim's interference with defendant's drug distribution 
business. 
Third, the interval between the murder and the seizure of the evidence from 
defendant's apartment was just over six weeks. R. 256: 155,170, 200; R. 258: 290, 
378. Therefore, the interval between the two crimes was relatively short. See 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f^ 32 (concluding that seven month interval between murder 
and robbery was relatively short). 
Fourth, and like the bad acts evidence in Decorso, "the need for the other 
crimes evidence was very high in this case, and the efficacy of alternative proof 
was very low." Id. at IT 33. The State's case rested primarily on the testimony of 
Todd's wife Clara and the drug runner, Carlos Delgado. Clara had been smoking 
cocaine for two straight days at the time of the murder and she fell asleep in the 
middle of a police interview a few hours after the murder. Clara also acknowl-
edged having sexual intercourse with Carlos on at least two prior occasions. 
Carlos was an admitted drug runner, was at the motel at the time of the shooting, 
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and drove the car in which the killer fled. Moreover, police never found the 
murder weapon and no fingerprints or other evidence directly linked defendant 
to the murder. In other words, the State's case rested on the testimony of a drug 
addict and an admitted drug runner with whom she had sex and who had both 
motive and opportunity to kill Todd. 
In light of that evidence, one need only imagine the argument of the defense 
absent evidence that defendant was a drug dealer to understand the importance 
of that evidence. Absent the evidence, the defense would have surely empha-
sized that the State introduced no evidence corroborating the witnesses' 
testimony that defendant was a drug dealer, much less Clara's drug dealer. 
Where no murder weapon was found and no fingerprints were identifiable, 
corroboration of the identification by Clara and Carlos could only be achieved 
through the evidence establishing that defendant was in fact a dealer. 
Finally, the degree to which the drug distribution evidence was likely to 
unfairly prejudice the jury was minor. The crime of distributing drugs or even 
possessing firearms paled in comparison to the crime of the execution-style 
murder. Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed to consider the drug 
distribution evidence only for proper, noncharacter purposes: 
The State has introduced evidence of other alleged wrongs or acts 
attributed to the defendant that he is not charged with in the Infor-
mation in this case. You may use this evidence to show the 
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defendant's identity, motive, plan, preparation, knowledge, intent, 
opportunity, or absence of accident as to the crimes that have been 
charged in the Information. You may consider this evidence relating 
to other acts from the witnesses today solely for the purposes that 
I've just explained and may not draw from such evidence the infer-
ence that the defendant has a character trait that establishes that he 
probably acted in conformity with that trait. Proof that the defen-
dant has engaged in a drug business may not be used to show that 
the defendant is not a truthful person or that he is a murderer. 
R. 194 (Instruction No. 28 - Addendum D). In light of the foregoing, the 
likelihood that the bad acts evidence would rouse the jury to "overmasting 
hostility" was minimal. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, | 29 (quoting Shickles, 760 R2d at 
296). 
When these factors are considered, therefore, the evidence seized from 
defendant's apartment was not unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence 
seized from defendant's apartment. The evidence was offered for the proper, 
noncharacter purpose of establishing the killer's identity and it satisfied the 
requirements of rules 402 and 403. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
Relevant Provisions of Law 
§ 77-17-13. Expert testimony generally—Notice requirements 
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to 
testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing 
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten 
days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony 
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare 
to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult 
with the opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee 
charged by the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on 
the results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call 
the witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon 
request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the 
information concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party 
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom 
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the 
information required under Subsection (l)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply 
with the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary 
to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's 
testimony will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately 
violated the provisions of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a 
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a 
report of the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter 
testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary 
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's 
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at 
which the expert may be called as an expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an 
employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing 
party is on reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert 
may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is made available to 
cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable notice. 
Laws 1994, c. 139, § 3; Laws 1999, c. 43, § 1, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2003, c. 
290, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003. 
Rule 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable 
in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404(b) 
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on 
good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
^ 
o 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SALVADOR TORRES-GARCIA, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF EXPERT WITNESS 
Case No. 031907945FS 
Judge ANN BOYDEN 
The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, David E. Yocom and Katherine Bernards-
Goodman, hereby provides notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13 (1953 as amended), of 
the State's intent to introduce expert opinion testimony through Dr. Todd Grey, a Chief Medical 
Examiner for the Office of the Medical Examiner and Craig Watson, Assistant Chief Investigator 
for the District Attorney's Office. Dr. Grey, whose curriculum vitae are attached, will be called 
i r\ 
to testify concerning the autopsy of the victim. Mr. Watson, whose curriculum vitae are 
attached, will be called to testify concerning drug trafficking. 
DATED this j c ; day of April, 2004. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LTHERINE BERNARDS-GOODMAN 
Deputy District Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the of April, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Expert Witness to be mailed to D. Richard Smith, Attorney for 
Defendant, at 4444 South 700 East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107. 
March 2004 
Expert Witness Background For: 
Assistant Chief Investigator Craig L. Watson 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
111 E. Broadway Ste 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
801-531-4192 
Current Assignment: Investigator Supervisor for Drug and Gang Teams 
Education: BS Degree/Business 
AS Degree/Criminal Justice 
Past Assignments: 1987—1988 SLCO Sheriffs Patrol Division Deputy 
1988—1990 Salt Lake County Sheriffs Narcotics Unit 
1990—1991 Metro Narcotics Task Force 
1991—1999 Wasatch Range Drug Task Force (WRTF) 
1999—1999 Sheriffs Patrol Division Supervisor 
1999—2003 WRTF Commander 
Investigation History Highlights: 
• Local, national, and international drug trafficking organizations. 
• Over 200 hand-to-hand undercover purchases (all types of illicit drugs). 
• Extensive work with informants, search warrants, investigative and administrative 
subpoenas, wiretaps, pen registers, video and audio surveillance. 
Training Highlights 
• FBI Financial crimes course 
• Financial Investigations (Investigation Training Institute) 
• DEA two-week drug school 
• Utah Narcotics Officer's Association (UNOA) 
• California Narcotics Officer's Association (CNOA) 
• National Intelligence Academy 
Formally recognized as an expert in the field of narcotics and wiretapping 
investigations by State and Federal Courts, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
• / 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KATHERINE BERNARDS-GOODMAN, Bar No. 5446 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
Fax: (801)366-7891 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS"! 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ORIGINAL 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SALVADOR TORRES-GARCIA, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED WITNESS LIST 
Case No. 031907945FS 
Katherine Bernards-Goodman, Deputy District Attorney, and Attorney for the Plaintiff, 
respectfully submits the following proposed witness list for the above-entitled case. 
Detective Prior 
Salt Lake City Police 
Dr. Todd Grey 
Utah State Medical Examiner 
Clarita Irwin 
Carlos Delgado-Cruz 
Officer Ricks 
Salt Lake City Police 
Officer Hanks 
Salt Lake City Police 
Detective Seibenek 
Salt Lake City Police 
Assistant Chief Investigator Craig Watson 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
DATED this £.fr day of May, 2004. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Deputy District Attorney 
A* * 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ^ 2Q day of May, 2004, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiffs Proposed Witness List was delivered to: 
Brennon Fuelling 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KATHERINE BERNARDS-GOODMAN, 5446 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
~vs-
SALVADOR TORRES-GARCIA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
Case No. 031907945FS 
Hon.ANNBOYDEN 
The State, by and through, Kathenne Bernards-Goodman, Deputy District Attorney, 
herein submits the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about September 23, 2003, John Todd Irwin and his wife, Clara Irwin were in then-
hotel room at 1865 West North Temple when they decided to call "Carlos" to order some 
drugs for their personal use. 
2. Within a few minutes, Carlos Delgado-Cruz arrived with the drugs for Mr. and Mrs. 
Irwin. While delivering the Irwins their drugs, Delgado-Cruz noticed a Salt Lake City 
Police Officer pulling into the parking lot. As a result, Delgado-Cruz left approximately 
50 balloons containing drugs with Mr. and Mrs. Irwin and left the scene. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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3. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Irwin called the dealer she knew supplied drugs for "Carlos'* and 
told him about the drugs. Mr. Irwin got on the phone and told the dealer he wanted 
something for <cholding the drugs". No agreement could be reached. 
4. Some time later that same evening multiple individuals entered the Irwin's hotel room, 
assaulted Mr. Irwin by striking him with a gun and then shot him in the head with the 
gun. 
5. On October 1, 2003 Mr. Irwin died as a result of the gunshot wound. 
6. On November 5, 2003 Carlos Delgado-Cruz came forward and told Detective Prior that 
he was present when Mr. Irwin was shot and that he was the drug runner who delivered 
drugs to Clara and Todd Irvin. Delgado-Cruz identified Defendants Salvador Torres-
Garcia and Elizar Balbuena-Para as the individuals who entered the Irwin's hotel room 
and assaulted Mr. Irwin. 
7. On November 11, 2003 a search warrant was executed at 1107 West 3900 South #901, 
the address identified by Carlos Delgado-Cruz as belonging to Defendant Salvador 
Torres-Garcia. Mr. Torres-Garcia was located in the residence, along with drugs and 
guns. 
8. On November 13, 2003 Clara Irwin identified Defendant Salvador Torres-Garcia as the 
individual who shot her husband on September 23, 2003 from a photo spread. She later 
identified Mr. Torres-Garcia at a line-up and again at preliminary hearing. 
9. Defendant Torres-Garcia now seeks through Motion in Limine to exclude the evidence of 
the drugs and guns located upon his arrest as well as evidence regarding his prior 
convictions. After review of the motions and hearing arguments, the court makes the 
following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant' s prior convictions qualify under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 for 
admission for impeachment purposes, if defendant chooses to take the stand. 
2. Defendant's prior convictions are felonies and occurred within the last 10 years. 
3. Defendant's prior convictions are for drug offenses. 
4. Defendant's prior convictions are extremely relevant to this case due to the fact 
that the case revolves around an alleged drug business conducted by Mr. Torees-
Garcia. 
5. Due to the fact that the jury will be hearing evidence regarding this drug business 
through the testimony of state's witnesses, Defendant's prior drug convictions 
will not be more prejudicial than probative. 
6. Evidence of the weapons and drugs found with the Defendant upon his arrest 
qualify for admissible evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
7. While the guns and drugs were not the same drugs or same gun involved in the 
homicide, they are probative for the non-character purposes of proving identity, 
intent, plan, preparation and lack of accident. 
8. Specifically the drugs and guns show a plan, a modis operendi, or scheme 
engaged in by defendant to conduct and protect a drug business. 
9. The evidence will not be more prejudicial than probative due to the fact that the 
jury will already hear this evidence through the testimony of state's witnesses. 
10. Neither is this evidence of the sort that should raise the jury to overmastering 
hostility. 
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ORDER 
Defendant's prior convictions are admissible for impeachment purposes under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609. Evidence of drags and guns found with the defendant upon 
his arrest are relevant to show a plan on the part of the defendant to conduct a drug 
business. The State is to prepare jury instructions regarding the evidence for the use of 
the jury. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2004, 
BY THE COURT: /&\ 
Approved as to form: 
Brennan Feuling 
. i/Tk 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Facts, 
Conclusions Of Law was delivered to Brennan Fueling, LDA. 
On the day of. 
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Instruction No. 
The State has introduced evidence of other alleged wrongs or acts attributed to 
the defendant that he is not charged with in the Information in this case. You may use 
this evidence to show the defendant's identity, motive, plan, preparation, knowledge, 
intent, opportunity, or absence of accident as to the crimes that have been charged in the 
Information. You may consider this evidence relating to other acts from the witnesses 
today solely for the purposes that I've just explained and may not draw from such 
evidence the inference that the defendant has a character trait that establishes he 
probably acted in conformity with that trait. Proof that the defendant has engaged in a 
drug business may not be used to show that the defendant is not a truthful person or that 
he is a murderer. 
